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ABSTRACT
After finishing the process of investigating digital evidence on a forensic
workstation, it is important for law enforcement to use a forensically sound machine
when starting a new investigation. To prevent cross-contamination of remnants
between cases, most law enforcement agencies seek to have a controlled operating
environment that can be reset to a sterile state which ensures that all remnants of
previous cases are not present. The discontinuation of Windows SteadyState™ has
left forensic investigators without a viable automated solution for ensuring a
controlled environment that protects the probative value of digital evidence. This
thesis project forensically validates and modifies an existing open-source
SteadyState™ solution, Forensics Steady State, which will provide law enforcement
officers with a viable substitution to other costly products.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
First and foremost, I would like to thank my program advisor Dr. Victor FayWolfe. Over the last few years, he helped me discover my interest in digital forensics
and has provided many opportunities. I cannot thank him enough for the endless
encouragement, guidance, and support he has provided throughout my graduate career.
Additionally, I would like to thank Jacob Fonseca. His guidance and time spend
assisting me with this project has been invaluable and greatly appreciated. I would
also like to thank everyone at the Digital Forensics and Cyber Security Center for all
of their help over the years.
Lastly, I would like to thank my friends and family for their endless support.
They have given me the support and encouragement to power on. I would specifically
like to thank Maura Ladino for always knowing how to provide me with moral support
during the most stressful times.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................. ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................ iv
LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................... vii
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................ ix
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ................................................................................1
1.1 Statement of the Problem ............................................................................................ 2
1.2 Justification for and Significance of the Study ............................................................... 2
1.3 Accomplishments ......................................................................................................... 4

CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF LITERATURE ...............................................................6
2.1 Faronics’ Deep Freeze .................................................................................................. 6
2.2 SteadyState™ for Windows 7 (Panos Macheras) ........................................................... 7
2.3 Horizon DataSys’ Drive Vaccine .................................................................................... 7
2.4 Steadier State ............................................................................................................... 8

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY ............................................................................. 13
3.1 Initial Steadier State Testing ....................................................................................... 16
3.1.1 Test Goal 1 .......................................................................................................... 16
3.1.2 Test Goal 2 .......................................................................................................... 18
3.1.3 Test Goal 3 .......................................................................................................... 18
3.1.4 Test Goal 4 .......................................................................................................... 19
3.2 Testing Environment and Hardware ........................................................................... 19
3.3 Testing Procedures ..................................................................................................... 20
3.3.1 Testing Procedure 1 ............................................................................................. 23
3.3.2 Testing Procedure 2 ............................................................................................. 24
3.3.3 Testing Procedure 3 ............................................................................................. 25
3.3.4 Testing Procedure 4 ............................................................................................. 26
3.3.5 Testing Procedure 5 ............................................................................................. 27

CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS ......................................................................................... 28
iv

4.1 Goal 1 Forensic Validation Findings ............................................................................ 29
4.1.1 File and Folder Write Test .................................................................................... 30
4.1.2 Application Write Test ......................................................................................... 31
4.1.3 Raw Hex Write Test – Volume Boot Record of Partition 2 .................................... 31
4.1.4 Raw Hex Write Test – Within Unpartitioned Space of the Disk ............................. 33
4.1.5 Raw Hex Write Test – Within image.vhd of Partition 2 ......................................... 34
4.1.6 Raw Hex Write Test – Within snapshot.vhd of Partition 2 .................................... 35
4.1.7 Raw Hex Write Test – Volume Boot Record of Partition 1 .................................... 36
4.1.8 Raw Hex Write Test – Outside Volume Boot Record of Partition 1 ....................... 37
4.1.9 Raw Hex Write to Virtualized C: Drive – Within Volume Boot Record ................... 38
4.1.10 Raw Hex Write to Virtualized C: Drive – Outside Volume Boot Record ............... 39
4.1.11 System Update Test – Using snapshot.vhd without Sysprep ............................... 40
4.1.12 System Update Test – Using snapshot.vhd with Sysprep .................................... 41
4.2 Goal 2 Forensic Validation Findings ............................................................................ 42
4.2.1 Rollback Time Measurement ............................................................................... 43
4.2.2 Update Time Measurement ................................................................................. 44
4.2.3 Keeping Temporary Writes .................................................................................. 46
4.3 Goal 3 Forensic Validation Findings ............................................................................ 47
4.3.1 Reboot Time Comparison .................................................................................... 47
4.3.2 Forensic Steady State Rollback Comparison to Normal Windows Reboot ............. 48
4.3.3 Merge Time for Forensic Steady State.................................................................. 49
4.4 Goal 4 Forensic Validation Findings ............................................................................ 50
4.4.1 Disk Overflow Test ............................................................................................... 50
4.4.2 Image File Write Test ........................................................................................... 51
4.4.3 Forensic Tool Test ................................................................................................ 52
4.4.4 Fixed Disk Test – Copying Files to a Write-protected Internal Hard Disk ............... 52
4.4.5 Fixed Disk Test – Copying Files to a Internal Hard Disk ......................................... 53

CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION .................................................................................... 55
5.1 Discussion of Results .................................................................................................. 55
5.2 Interesting Results ...................................................................................................... 59
5.3 Future Work ............................................................................................................... 61

v

5.4 Conclusion.................................................................................................................. 61

APPENDIX 1: Forensics Steady State Creation Process ............................................ 63
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................... 65

vi

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE

PAGE

Table 1- List of Hard Drives Used in Experimentation .............................................. 20
Table 2 - Expected Results of Tests Performed ......................................................... 23
Table 3 - Test Summaries .......................................................................................... 29
Table 4 - Matching Hash for image.vhd After Test 4.1.1 ........................................... 31
Table 5 - Matching Hash for image.vhd After Test 4.1.2 ........................................... 31
Table 6 - Matching Hash for image.vhd After Test 4.1.3 ........................................... 33
Table 7 - Matching Hash for image.vhd After Test 4.1.4 ........................................... 34
Table 8 - Matching Hash for image.vhd After Test 4.1.5 ........................................... 35
Table 9 - Matching Hash for image.vhd After Test 4.1.6 ........................................... 36
Table 10 - Matching Hash for image.vhd After Test 4.1.7 ......................................... 37
Table 11 - Matching Hash for image.vhd After Test 4.1.8 ......................................... 38
Table 12 - Matching Hash for image.vhd After Test 4.1.9 ......................................... 39
Table 13 - Matching Hash for image.vhd After Test 4.1.10 ....................................... 40
Table 14 - Rollback Time Comparisons .................................................................... 44
Table 15 - Average Rollback Times .......................................................................... 44
Table 16 - Update Time Comparisons ....................................................................... 45
Table 17 - Average Update Times ............................................................................. 45
Table 18 - Reboot Time Comparison ......................................................................... 48
Table 19 - Average Reboot Times ............................................................................. 48
Table 20 - Rollback of Solution Compared to Normal Windows 7 Boot .................... 48

vii

Table 21 - Average Rollback Time (FSS) compared to Average Reboot Time (Win 7)
................................................................................................................................. 49
Table 22 - Recorded Times to Update Baseline Image .............................................. 49
Table 23 - Average Baseline Image Update Time ...................................................... 50

viii

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE

PAGE

Figure 1 - Process Flow Diagram: Creating and Deploying Steadier State ................. 10
Figure 2 – Flow Chart for Steadier State ................................................................... 12
Figure 3 – Flow Chart for Forensics Steady State ...................................................... 15
Figure 4 - Windows Error Message Not Allowing Disk Writes ................................. 32
Figure 5 - Disk Overflow Test Indicating Low Disk Space ........................................ 51

ix

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

In the modern day, the computer crime rate across the world is growing at a rapid
pace. Figuring out who committed a crime, using what device, at which location is all
part of the puzzle law enforcement investigators are faced with when presented with
digital evidence. Following a specific forensic process is crucial when presenting
analyzed evidence to the court system. How does law enforcement collect and
analyze digital evidence in a way that preserves the probative value of digital
evidence?
The digital forensic process is comprised of four main steps: seizure, acquisition,
analysis, and documentation. Digital forensic investigations involve developing and
testing hypotheses made about the present state of a computer. Law enforcement must
seize any device they feel is necessary that may contain digital evidence. These
evidence items include computer hard drives, cell phones, routers, switches, gaming
systems, or any other electronic device that stores digital data.
Once evidence items are seized, they are acquired using tools installed onto a
forensic workstation. Forensic workstations are often Windows or Linux machines
that have software to prevent any original evidence from being altered in any way.
During the acquisition phase, an exact bit-for-bit copy of the evidence is made in the
form of an image file preserving the original state of the evidence. After the
acquisition phase, evidence is analyzed using forensic software that observes the state
of the evidence image. During analysis, investigators use this forensic software to
search through the image to find information that either supports or refutes the
hypotheses made for the investigation. It is important that all of these procedures are
1

performed on a controlled, sterile environment that will not alter the original evidence
in any way. Finally, once the evidence image has been analyzed and the hypotheses
made about the state of the computer has been made, all findings are documented and
reported.
1.1 Statement of the Problem
The purpose of this thesis project is to improve an existing SteadyState™
replacement solution to create a Forensics Steady State tool for newer Microsoft
Windows operating systems and to verify its forensic integrity so that it can be used by
law enforcement investigators. The result is a controlled, forensically-sound,
Windows 7 environment that can be reproduced, re-used, and is free from crosscontamination.
1.2 Justification for and Significance of the Study
When a forensic investigator analyzes digital data on a forensic workstation,
he/she must be careful to maintain the probative value of the resulting evidence by
being able to demonstrate that their investigation did not corrupt the evidence in any
way. A primary concern is cross-contamination, where digital evidence from one case
that the investigator worked makes its way into another case, and in doing so
undermines the probative value of the evidence. Evidence from a previous case can
include, but is not limited to: pictures, documents, applications, email, and viruses. To
prevent cross-contamination, most law enforcement agencies seek to have a controlled
operating environment (e.g. the forensic workstation’s operating system and installed
files) that can be reset to a sterile state which ensures that all remnants of previous
cases are not present.

2

Investigators often use ad hoc methods for establishing a controlled operating
environment. One method is to wipe the forensic workstation’s systems disk and reinstall the operating systems and tools completely before each investigation. Another
method is to use a master image of the operating environment from which they clone a
new investigation environment. While these methods are commonly used, they
present serious limitations. The first method is extremely time consuming and can take
upwards of an entire business day to prepare a new forensic environment. The second
method can cause update lag, where new versions of tools are not updated in the
master image for long periods of time due to the efforts required to produce a new
image.
In addition to these ad hoc techniques, there have been some automated
techniques, such as Microsoft Corporation’s Windows SteadyState™, a free, simple,
elegant solution to the controlled environment problem. It allows administrative users
to protect their systems from viruses, malware, and unwanted application installations
by tracking all changes to a machine’s current state, and discarding them whenever the
administrator chooses to do so. Upon discarding the changes, the machine is returned
to its original state. Every change made to the system since its last save point is
deleted. Windows SteadyState™ has proven to be an effective tool for forensic
investigators. Unfortunately, Windows SteadyState™ has been phased out since
December 31, 2010 with Windows Vista being the last operating system supported by
the solution [Microsoft Support]. This has left forensic investigators without a viable
automated solution for ensuring a controlled environment that protects the probative
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value of digital evidence that is compatible with Windows 7 and future operating
systems.
The goals of this research project are as follows:
1.

To make a controlled environment solution that ensures that a sterile digital
forensics environment can be created each time a new case is started by law
enforcement investigators.

2.

To make a controlled environment solution that is easy for forensic
practitioners to use.

3.

To make a controlled environment solution that does not substantially delay
investigations.

4.

To have a solution that does not interfere with the forensic process.

5.

To document the controlled environment solution behaviors proving forensic
readiness.

6.

The reboot process of the solution should automate the roll back procedure and
boot directly into a Windows environment after completion, as required by the
Rhode Island State Police Computer Crimes Unit.

1.3 Accomplishments
This project documented the controlled environment solution behaviors through
extensive testing to prove forensic readiness of Forensics Steady State. The outcomes
from this project ensured a stable, sterile digital forensics environment that does not
substantially delay investigations or interfere with the forensic process. Forensics
Steady State also has ease of use for forensic practitioners including the added
function of the automatic roll back.
4
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF LITERATURE
This chapter provides a survey of current solutions to the proposed problem
presented in section 1.1 that support modern Microsoft operating systems. One
solution, Faronics’ Deep Freeze, is a commercial product that is marketed to preserve
the state of a host operating system environment for general use. A community
supported replacement for the original Microsoft SteadyState™ provides techniques
for users to develop their own solution. Horizon DataSys’ Drive Vaccine is also
briefly explained.
2.1 Faronics’ Deep Freeze
Faronics’ Deep Freeze [Faronics] is software that can restore Windows, Mac OS,
and Linux operating systems back to an original state that is pre-defined by the user.
It can function as a SteadyState™ replacement, but previous research on Windows
machines has shown that Deep Freeze is not compatible with the requirements of
digital forensic investigations [Fonseca]. Problems exist with saving case information
to external drives and removing external drives during the computer’s operation.
Older versions of Deep Freeze have been shown to crash Windows 7 computers when
evidence hard drives are attached internally and removed after the imaging process
when using drive trays.
Previous versions of Deep Freeze are also insufficient in that files can appear to
be written to external drives, which are transparently locked, creating problems for
retaining investigators’ case information. We tested the newest version of Deep
Freeze Enterprise and discovered that this problem still persists. There are options to
add certain drive letters to a “whitelist” during the initial creation of a Deep Freeze
6

solution that will allow those drives to be written to without write-protection. This
option is not easily accessible and the illusion of seeing the files copied to a
destination drive, when the action does not actually occur, can be problematic for law
enforcement investigations.
2.2 SteadyState™ for Windows 7 (Panos Macheras)
Currently, there is no formal SteadyState™ solution for Windows 7 provided by
Microsoft. In July of 2001, Panos Macheras, a Microsoft developer, released his
methodology for creating a Windows 7 SteadyState™ like tool for use in internet
cafés, educational computer laboratories, and other establishments that use Windows 7
workstations [Macheras]. Macheras’ procedure claims to work on any machine, but
through initial testing we have concluded that it is not an adequate steady state
replacement. Using Macheras’ methodology to create the Windows 7 Steady State
replacement, we were not able to create a working Steady State. The inability to
reproduce Macheras’ work fails to provide a solution for goal 1 of this project. Due to
the fact that a working version of Macheras’ solution could not be created, the solution
also fails to meet goals 2-4 of this research project as well.
2.3 Horizon DataSys’ Drive Vaccine
Horizon DataSys’ Drive Vaccine is another application designed specifically for
Microsoft Windows that shares similar functionality to Windows SteadyState™.
Drive Vaccine operates under Microsoft Windows and has the capability to rollback to
previous baseline images if a system becomes corrupt with any form of system error
preventing normal operation. Drive Vaccine could be considered a viable option for
digital forensic investigations, but it has not been forensically validated.
7

2.4 Steadier State
In 2012 Mark Minasi, of MR&D, released his own open source version of a
SteadyState™ replacement for Windows 7 which is named Steadier State [Minasi].
Steadier State uses a technique called differencing disks to make the SteadyState™
solution function on a Windows 7 Enterprise or Ultimate machine that takes advantage
of Windows 7’s ability to boot from Virtual Hard Disks.
Virtual Hard Disk (VHD) files are virtual representations of hard disks that
provide the same functionality as a regular hard disk drive. VHDs encapsulate hard
disk images that can contain partitions and file systems specific to the operating
system installed into the virtual disk file. VHDs were originally created for use as
storage media for virtual machines that are running in Windows Virtual PC, Windows
Virtual Server, or Hyper-V. Windows 7 Enterprise and Ultimate editions and
Windows 8 now have native support for booting from VHD files eliminating the need
for a hypervisor. When natively booting a VHD, performance is greatly enhanced and
there is improved support for Operating System features that are not available in a
hypervisor such as Windows Virtual PC [Calvert, 2009].
There are three different kinds of VHD formats that can be created: fixed,
dynamic, and differencing. Fixed sized VHDs are a static size that is stored on a
physical storage device when the virtual file is created. The size of fixed VHDs
cannot be decreased, but can be increased when the file is disconnected and able to be
edited [Jain, 2010]. Dynamic VHDs only use as much space on the physical storage
device as needed to store the data in the file and can expand as new blocks in the
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virtual disk are used. Typically, dynamic VHDs have slower read/write performance
than fixed disks [Jain, 2010].
Differencing VHDs are comprised of two or more components, a parent VHD and
one or multiple child VHD(s). Any child VHD files are linked to the parent and
represent the current state of the VHD as a set of modified blocks in comparison to its
parent [Jain, 2010]. The parent VHD can be either fixed or dynamic in relation to its
differencing child VHD. Differencing VHDs are analogous to creating snapshots of a
virtual machine when using a hypervisor.
Steadier State utilizes the differencing disk technology in order to recreate a
Windows 7 SteadyState™. The baseline image.vhd acts as the parent VHD and
snapshot.vhd acts as the child VHD caching any/all writes made when natively booted
into the VHD file. Currently, no explicit documentation has been released by
Microsoft that explains exactly how a machine boots into a VHD using Windows 7
Enterprise/Ultimate native boot to VHD ability.
To implement Steadier State, users must follow a detailed course of action (see
Figure 1). First, users need to create a boot disk using tools from the Windows
Automated Installation Kit (WAIK) and scripts provided by the Steadier State
package. A media disk is connected to a prepared target Windows computer and a
VHD image of the prepared computer is created onto the media drive using tools
provided by the boot disk. The resulting image is a VHD file that will be used as the
basis for the new machine operating system. Once that image is created, the hard disk
containing the original operating system is wiped and prepared, and the VHD file is
copied to the disk. The disk now contains the VHD file that the PC boots into. For a
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fully detailed procedure of the process flow, including specific scripts for creating and
deploying Steadier State, see Figure 1.

Figure 1 - Process Flow Diagram: Creating and Deploying Steadier State

When the user restarts the computer, two options are presented. The selected
option will determine which of several states that Steadier State could be put into (see
10

Figure 2). The default first option boots into the Windows 7 environment caching all
writes into a snapshot.vhd file. The second option rolls back the system deleting the
existing snapshot file containing all written changes to the disk made since the last
rollback. A new empty snapshot file is then created and the system returns to its
original state. If the user chooses to update software or make any changes to the
system permanent, they must first place an empty text file named “noauto.txt” on the
root of the D drive. When the user reboots the computer, selecting the roll back option
opens the WinPE environment and pauses at a command line prompt. The user can
then choose to run a merge script, provided by Steadier State, to accept permanent
changes to the base image by merging the snapshot and parent image VHD files and
creating a new empty snapshot file to cache future writes.

11

Figure 2 – Flow Chart for Steadier State

During the initial testing of Steadier State, the solution seemed promising, but
was also too difficult for the general law enforcement user failing to meet the
requirements of Goal 2. Furthermore, it has not been extensively tested for forensic
validation, a necessity for law enforcement, failing to meet the requirements of Goal 5.
Steadier State served as the base implementation on which Forensics Steady State is
based to improve the solution and meet the goals of this project. Section 3.1
elaborates on the extensive testing that has been conducted as part of the forensic
validation of Forensics Steady State.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

This section describes how this project created the Forensics Steady State tool to
meet the goals of chapter 1. It first outlines how this project thoroughly tested the
existing Steadier State solution on which the implementation of Forensics Steady State
is based. Section 3.2 describes possible future enhancements to Forensics Steady
State. Sections 4 and 5 later discuss testing environments and procedures.
Forensics Steady State was implemented using the existing files and command
scripts provided by Steadier State with modifications. The original boot process of
Steadier State provides the user with two boot options every time the machine is
restarted with Windows 7 is always being selected as the default boot option when the
pre-boot environment is displayed. Selecting the Windows 7 option boots the system
into snapshot.vhd which will contain all changes and writes that currently reside on
the image (Figure 2). After restarting or shutting down the machine, the user is always
presented with the options to “Roll Back Windows” or “Windows 7”. This thesis
project modified Steadier State to change the default boot process and add in the
ability to scan the D drive for extraneous files.
The modifications to Steadier State included adding commands into some of the
provided command scripts to change the default boot order. Goal 6 specifies that the
Rhode Island State Police Computer Crimes Unit requires the reboot process of their
forensic workstations to automate the roll back procedure and boot directly into
Windows after completion, without requiring any user input. In order to accomplish
this task, the default boot entry was changed from “Windows 7” to “Roll Back
Windows” by modifying the system’s Boot Configuration Data (BCD) store. The
13

Boot Configuration Data store is a database file that contains the boot configuration
for all bootable devices/partitions [Technet, 2007]. When the “prepnewpc” command
is run during the Steadier State creation process (Figure 1), the hard drive that will
contain Steadier State is wiped and partitioned to contain a copy of WinPE. Within
the command script of “prepnewpc”, commands were added that store the globally
unique identifier (GUID) for the bootable WinPE partition after the storage device is
prepared. Then, commands were added to the “rollback.cmd” script that stores the
default GUID in a file named “defaultguid.dat” which is saved to the same partition
that stores both image.vhd and snapshot.vhd. One last command was added to both
the “rollback.cmd” and “merge.cmd” scripts that reads the GUID from
“defaultguid.dat” and sets the Windows 7 boot option as the default for one time after
a successful rollback or merge operation is performed.
Now, when the user restarts the computer, “Roll Back Windows” is the default
boot option (Figure 3). The option to boot directly into the Windows 7 environment is
still present in the pre-boot environment. Once the solution is rolled back, the BCD is
modified to automatically boot into Windows 7 after the baseline image is restored.
Essentially, a user could simply shutdown or restart their Forensics Steady State
solution and have a pristine Windows 7 image restored without any further user
interaction.

14

Figure 3 – Flow Chart for Forensics Steady State

Additional functionality was added into “rollback.cmd” that recursively scans the
partition containing image.vhd, snapshot.vhd, and defaultguid.dat for extraneous files.
If any files are found, the user is prompted with a notification that additional files
reside on the drive that should be removed before beginning a new case.
In summary, the following additions were made to Steadier State to create
Forensics Steady State:
15



Automatic roll back upon shutdown or reboot of system without requiring user
input.



Recursive scanning of physical drive for extraneous files and recommendation
for deletion before beginning a new digital forensic investigation.

3.1 Initial Steadier State Testing
The first step of this project was to thoroughly test Forensics Steady State using
the goals listed in chapter 1.
3.1.1 Test Goal 1
This test determined if Forensics Steady State ensures that a sterile digital
forensics environment can be created each time a new case is started by law
enforcement investigators, as stated by Goal 1. The test started by determining if the
stated functionality of Forensics Steady State is reliably achieved. It should meet its
claims that:


The .vhd file created by Forensics Steady State is never written to unless a merge
script is executed.



All writes to the disk are placed within the snapshot.vhd file created every time
Forensics Steady State rolls back.



The image.vhd file will never become changed. Physically changing the bytes of
an image with the use of a hex editor, the image’s bytes should always remain
persistent and never change.
I created an image of a forensic workstation and performed tests that included:
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Adding files and folders to a Windows 7 forensics workstation, rolling back the
machine, and confirming all changes were deleted.



Installing applications to Windows 7, rolling back the machine, and confirming all
changes were deleted.



Changing individual bytes on both the image.vhd (baseline image) file and
snapshot.vhd file to confirm that once the system is rolled back, all changes were
not kept and the original baseline image was intact.



Test the environment extensively with all of the most important digital forensic
tools currently used by the Rhode Island State Police and other law enforcement
agencies to ensure their proper functioning. These tools include X-Ways’
Forensics, Guidance’s EnCase, AccessData’s Forensics Toolkit, and
ForensicSoft’s SAFEBlock.



Test disk overflow behavior where more files are written to the environment than
specified.



Test the ability to recognize external disk drives that are connected to the forensic
workstation and the stability of hot-swapping external media.
To confirm that a sterile environment is achieved in all of these tests, an MD5

hash of the image.vhd file will be taken to ensure it returned to its original state. In
order to test assumptions about the system, bytes contained within the .vhd file were
manually changed to test both “Roll back” functionality and write-blocking
capabilities.

17

3.1.2 Test Goal 2
This test determined if Forensics Steady State is easy for law enforcement
investigators to use, as stated by Goal 2. In order to test the ease of use of the Steadier
State solution, I compared it to other comparable products Deep Freeze and Pacheras’
Steady State solution using the criteria:


The time and process of reverting back to baseline images using each product.



The time and process of updating the solution and retaining changes as a new
baseline image for each product.



The process of keeping changes temporarily for each product.

3.1.3 Test Goal 3
This test determined if Forensics Steady State did not substantially delay
investigations, as stated by Goal 3. In order to test this goal, several aspects of rebooting the solution were tested:


For an on-going investigation, officers need the ability to turn off their
workstations without “rolling back” the machine and have their current
analysis saved. The re-boot time of the Forensics Steady State machine was
timed and compared to a normal re-boot of a similar Windows 7 machine.



When software needs to be updated on the Forensics Steady State machine, the
“merge” script will be run so that the solution retains the updates even upon
“roll back”. The time it takes to merge the snapshot.vhd file with the baseline
image was recorded.



When an investigator has finished a case, the system must be rolled back,
deleting any files, applications, or case remnants that may exist on the system
18

and retuned back to its original baseline image. The time it takes to delete the
snapshot file and re-boot to the clean environment was recorded and compared
to the re-boot time of a normal Windows 7 re-boot on a similar machine.
3.1.4 Test Goal 4

This test determined if Forensics Steady State does not interfere with the forensic
process and is stable by measuring if/how often the system crashes and how often that
it runs appropriately. Most of the tests in Test Goal 1 will help with testing stability,
but more tests involving common forensics tools were also performed. The software
that was tested on the solution was consistent with tools that the Rhode Island State
Police use.

3.2 Testing Environment and Hardware
The Forensics Steady State solution was implemented on a 500 GB Seagate
Barracuda Hard Drive. All hard drives used were tested on a Dell OptiPlex 760, x86based PC with an Intel Core 2 Duo (2.66GHz) processor, and 4 GB of installed RAM.
The Forensic Steady State image was created using the Steadier State procedure for a
Microsoft Windows 7 Enterprise operating system.
Section 3.4 outlines specific testing procedures used to validate the forensic
integrity of Steadier State. The testing procedures also include the testing of
functionality of several programs commonly used by digital forensic investigators: XWays Forensics, EnCase, FTK, and ForensicSoft’s SAFEBlock [ForensicsWiki].
The following hard drives were used during the testing phase of this thesis:
Make/Model

Capacity
19

Purpose

1.

2.

3.

4.
5.

Seagate
S/N: 5QM1H255
Model: ST3500320AS
Seagate
S/N: 5Q61QCTL
Model: ST3500630AS
Seagate
S/N: 5QM1EXCS
Model:
Samsung
Model: HD161GJ
Western Digital
S/N: WMAV33252519
Model: WD1600AAJS-75M0A0

500 GB

Steadier State

500 GB

Source Windows 7
Enterprise

500 GB

Contains and
deploys image.vhd

160 GB

Contains Deep
Freeze solution
Contains Drive
Vaccine solution

160 GB

Table 1- List of Hard Drives Used in Experimentation

3.3 Testing Procedures
The following sections detail specific test procedures performed to forensically
validate the Forensics Steady State solution. The Forensics Steady State Test Plan
was developed specifically to forensically validate Forensics Steady State to test all
known areas of a hard disk that has the solution deployed to it. In this case, specific
tests were developed to make logical and physical writes to the two known partitions
created by the solution as well as unpartitioned space and the boot records associated
with each area of the disk. Each procedure has detailed steps with test-specific
functions built in to allow for a testing procedure to be re-used for validating each
aspect of the goals for this thesis. The test-specific functions for each test procedure
can be found in Chapter 4. Chapter 4 discusses each test individually, including any
test-specific functions performed and the results and implications of each test. These
tests are re-usable for any solution similar to Forensics Steady State, such as Deep
Freeze or Drive Vaccine, with the appropriate changes for each test made specific to
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tool being forensically validated. Table 2 lists all of the tests that were performed
along with the expected results of each test.
Test
File and Folder Write Test

Requirement
Goal 1

Application Write Test

Goal 1

Raw Hex Write Test – Volume Boot
Record of Partition 2

Goal 1

Raw Hex Write Test – Within
Unpartitioned Space of the disk

Goal 1

Raw Hex Write Test – Within
image.vhd of Partition 2

Goal 1

Raw Hex Write Test – Within
snapshot.vhd of Partition 2

Goal 1

Raw Hex Write Test – Volume Boot
Record of Partition 1

Goal 1

Raw Hex Write Test – Outside
Volume Boot Record of Partition 1

Goal 1

Raw Hex Write to Virtualized C:
Goal 1
Drive – Within Volume Boot Record

Raw Hex Write to Virtualized C:
Drive – Outside Volume Boot
Record

Goal 1

System Update Test – Using
snapshot.vhd without Sysprep

Goal 1

System Update Test – Using

Goal 1
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Expected Results
All logical writes made to
the system will be deleted
upon rollback.
All logical writes made to
the system will be deleted
upon rollback.
Raw hex writes made to
the VBR of Partition 2 will
be deleted upon rollback.
Raw hex writes made to
unallocated space of
Partition 2 will be deleted
upon rollback.
Raw hex writes made
within the image.vhd file
will be deleted upon
rollback.
Raw hex writes made
within the snapshot.vhd
file will be deleted upon
rollback.
Raw hex writes made to
the VBR of Partition 1 will
be deleted upon rollback.
Raw hex writes made to
WinPE portion of Partition
1 will be deleted upon
rollback.
Raw hex writes made to
VBR of virtualized C
Drive will be deleted upon
rollback.
Raw hex writes made to
virtualized C drive outside
of VBR will be deleted on
rollback.
The snapshot file will not
be accepted by Machine 2
and will fail.
The snapshot file will not

snapshot.vhd with Sysprep
Rollback Time Measurement

Goal 2

Update Time Measurement

Goal 2

Keeping Temporary Writes

Goal 2

Reboot Time Comparison

Goal 3

Forensic Steady State Rollback
Comparison to Normal Windows
Reboot

Goal 3

Merge Time for Forensic Steady
State

Goal 3

Disk Overflow Test

Goal 4

Image File Write Test

Goal 4

Forensic Tool Test

Goal 4

Fixed Disk Test – Copying Files to a
Write-protected Internal Hard Disk

Goal 4

Fixed Disk Test – Copying Files to

Goal 4
22

be accepted by Machine 2
and will fail.
The rollback times of all
tested solutions will be
similar.
The update times of all
tested solutions will be
similar.
Forensics Steady State will
merge the snapshot.vhd
and image.vhd files and
work successfully.
The reboot times of a
normal Windows 7
machine and Forensics
Steady State will be
similar.
Forensics Steady State will
take longer to rollback than
a normal Windows 7
machine takes to perform a
normal reboot.
The average merge time
for Forensics Steady State
will take between 2 and 5
minutes.
Windows will not allow
oversized files to overflow
the disk and will prompt
the user for additional
storage media.
Forensics Steady State will
be able to use forensics
tools to create a disk image
successfully.
Forensics Steady State will
be able to run forensic
software, create temporary
case files, and be fully
functional.
SAFE Block will be fully
functional with Forensics
Steady State and writeprotect disk drives
appropriately.
Any files copied to the

an Internal Hard Disk

attached internal media
will be copied
successfully.
Table 2 - Expected Results of Tests Performed

3.3.1 Testing Procedure 1
The purpose of Testing Procedure 1 is to investigate Forensics Steady State’s
behavior when raw disk writes are made while booted into the environment, and to
ensure that all files, folders, applications, and raw disk writes are deleted upon
rollback of the solution, and that the original baseline image remains consistent and
forensically sound. The procedure can be re-used for each different raw disk write test
performed to test Goal 1 and satisfy the claims in Section 3.1.1.
This procedure uses Message-Digest algorithm 5 (MD5) which is a cryptographic
hash function that generates a 128-bit hash value. In digital forensic investigations,
the MD5 algorithm is used to generate a digital signature of files/disks. These
signatures are then used to validate images made of digital evidence to ensure the
image is a bit-for-bit copy of the original file/disk. Identical MD5 hash values indicate
that the image is an exact copy of the original source evidence. If the signatures do
not match, then the image cannot be forensically validated because it does not
accurately reflect the original media [Hoog, 2008]. This procedure makes use of
Backtrack 5 R3 64-bit gnome for taking MD5 hash values of image.vhd in a
forensically sound environment. The procedure is:
1. Boot machine with hard drive containing Forensics Steady State with
BackTrack Live CD.
2. Navigate to directory containing “image.vhd” and take MD5 hash of the file.
3. Record hash value and shutdown machine.
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4. Boot machine into Forensics Steady State environment, click “Roll back”
machine.
5. Perform test-specific functions.
6. Shutdown Forensics Steady State environment.
7. Restart machine and select “roll back”.
8. When rollback is complete, shut down the machine.
9. Boot machine with hard drive containing Forensics Steady State with
BackTrack Live CD.
10. Navigate to directory containing “image.vhd” and take MD5 Hash of the file.
11. Record hash value and shutdown machine.
It is important to note that if the MD5 hash value of image.vhd from Step 10 does not
match the MD5 hash value taken in Step 2, then the baseline image of Forensics
Steady State has been altered. In this case, a new image should be deployed onto a
wiped hard drive to guarantee the workstation is forensically sound.
3.3.2 Testing Procedure 2
The purpose of Testing Procedure 2 is to determine if Forensics Steady State is
easy for law enforcement investigators to use. In order to test the ease of use of the
solution, it was compared to other comparable products - Faronics’ Deep Freeze,
Pacheras’ Steady State solution, and Horizon DataSys’ Drive Vaccine. The procedure
illustrates the main differences in behavior between Forensics Steady State, Deep
Freeze, and Drive Vaccine. These differences include rollback times, updating times,
and the method used to retain temporary changes until a rollback or merge is
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performed. The procedure can be re-used for each test-specific function to test Goal 2
and satisfy the claims in Section 3.1.2. The procedure is:
1. Boot machine with hard drive containing Deep Freeze.
2. Perform test-specific functions for Deep Freeze.
3. Shutdown Deep Freeze environment.
4. Boot machine with hard drive containing Drive Vaccine.
5. Perform test-specific functions for Drive Vaccine.
6. Shutdown Drive Vaccine.
7. Boot machine with hard drive containing Forensics Steady State
8. Perform test-specific functions for Forensics Steady State
9. Shutdown Forensics Steady State.
3.3.3 Testing Procedure 3
The purpose of Testing Procedure 3 is to determine if Forensics Steady State does
not substantially delay investigations. This procedure works directly with the
Forensics Steady State solution and compares it to a normal Windows 7 Enterprise
machine like the forensic workstations that may currently be in use by law
enforcement agencies and other forensic practitioners. For the purposes of these tests,
the source Windows 7 computer from which the baseline image for Forensics Steady
State was built was used for comparison. The procedure can be re-used for each test
specific function to test Goal 3 and satisfy the claims in Section 3.1.3. The procedure
is:
1. Boot machine with hard drive containing Forensics Steady State.
2. Perform test-specific functions for Forensics Steady State.
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3. Shutdown Forensics Steady State environment.
4. Boot machine with hard drive containing normal Windows 7 OS.
5. Perform test-specific functions for normal Win7 machine.
6. Shutdown Windows 7 machine.
3.3.4 Testing Procedure 4
The purpose of Testing Procedure 4 is to determine if multiple Forensics Steady
State solutions can be updated by copying and distributing the snapshot.vhd file from
one updated machine to another Forensic Steady State machine. Typically, updating
an entire laboratory of Windows machines can be time consuming. The motivation of
this procedure is to determine if updating one Forensics Steady State solution can
simplify the process of updating several machines simply by copying the snapshot.vhd
file from the updated machine and overwriting the snapshot.vhd file on other unupdated machines. Observations will be recorded detailing if the changes are accepted
and retained. The procedure can be re-used for each test specific function to test both
Goal 2 in terms of ease of use, and Goal 3 in terms of not substantially delaying
investigations. The procedure is:
1. Boot first machine with hard drive containing Forensics Steady State.
2. Choose the rollback option upon re-boot to ensure the original image is used.
3. Perform test-specific functions for Forensics Steady State on machine 1.
4. Shutdown Forensics Steady State environment.
5. Boot machine 1 with BackTrack Live CD and attach external hard drive.
6. Copy Snapshot.vhd from machine 1 hard drive to external hard drive.
7. Shutdown machine 1.
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8. Boot machine 2 with hard drive containing Forensics Steady State.
9. Choose the rollback option upon re-boot to ensure snapshot file will be empty.
10. Shutdown machine 2.
11. Boot machine 2 with BackTrack Live CD and attach external hard drive.
12. Copy over the Snapshot.vhd file from the external hard drive to the hard drive
belonging to machine 2, overwriting the old snapshot file.
13. Shutdown machine 2 and remove BackTrack Live CD
14. Boot machine 2 and record behavior.
3.3.5 Testing Procedure 5
The purpose of Testing Procedure 5 is to determine if Forensics Steady State is
functional with forensic software including X-Ways Forensics, FTK, EnCase, and
ForensicSoft’s SAFE Block software write-blocker. Typically, in digital forensic
investigations, law enforcement must collect and image hard drives or other digital
media and ensure all devices can be imaged while being write-protected to preserve
the integrity of the evidence. Law enforcement must be able to use their normal
forensic tool suite when performing investigations. The procedure can be re-used for
each test specific function to test Goal 4 and satisfy the claims in Section 3.1.4.
1. Boot machine with hard drive containing Forensics Steady State.
2. Perform test-specific functions.
3. Shutdown Forensics Steady State.
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CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS

This chapter discusses the tests performed to forensically validate the Forensics
Steady State solution. Table 3 lists all of the tests performed, along with which
requirements they satisfy, and the result of each test. For more detailed procedure and
results, please see corresponding sections in this chapter.
Test
4.1.1 File and Folder Write Test
4.1.2 Application Write Test
4.1.3 Raw Hex Write Test – Volume
Boot Record of Partition 2

Requirement
Goal 1
Goal 1
Goal 1

Goal 1

Result
Succeeded
Succeeded
Failed – OS unable to
reboot after boot sector is
written to.
Failed – Writes remain
after rollback
Succeeded

4.1.4 Raw Hex Write Test – Within
Unpartitioned space of the disk
4.1.5 Raw Hex Write Test – Within
image.vhd of Partition 2
4.1.6 Raw Hex Write Test – Within
snapshot.vhd of Partition 2
4.1.7 Raw Hex Write Test – Volume
Boot Record of Partition 1

Goal 1

Goal 1

Succeeded

Goal 1

Goal 1

Failed – OS unable to
reboot after boot sector is
written to.
Failed – OS unable to
reboot after disk is written
to.
Failed – OS unable to
reboot after boot sector is
written to.
Succeeded

4.1.8 Raw Hex Write Test – Outside
Volume Boot Record of Partition 1

Goal 1

4.1.9 Raw Hex Write to Virtualized
C: Drive – Within Volume Boot
Record
4.1.10 Raw Hex Write to Virtualized
C: Drive – Outside Volume Boot
Record
4.1.11 System Update Test – Using
snapshot.vhd without Sysprep
4.1.12 System Update Test – Using
snapshot.vhd with Sysprep

Goal 1

Goal 1

Succeeded

Goal 1

Failed – OS unable to
reboot due to snapshot.vhd
belonging another
sysprepped machine.
Drive Vaccine has the
fastest rollback time.
Drive Vaccine’s update

4.2.1 Rollback Time Measurement

Goal 2

4.2.2 Update Time Measurement

Goal 2
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4.2.3 Keeping Temporary Writes
4.3.1 Reboot Time Comparison

Goal 2
Goal 3

4.3.2 Forensic Steady State Rollback
Comparison to Normal Windows
Reboot

Goal 3

4.3.3 Merge Time for Forensic
Steady State

Goal 3

4.4.1 Disk Overflow Test
4.4.2 Image File Write Test
4.4.3 Forensic Tool Test
4.4.4 Fixed Disk Test – Copying
Files to a Write-protected Internal
Hard Disk
4.4.5 Fixed Disk Test – Copying
Files to a Internal Hard Disk

Goal 4
Goal 4
Goal 4
Goal 4

time is instantaneous.
N/A
Forensics Steady State
reboots faster than a
normal Windows 7
workstation.
Windows 7 workstation
reboots faster than total
rollback time of Forensics
SteadyState.
Forensics Steady State has
an average update time of
01:33.60.
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful

Goal 4

Successful

Table 3 - Test Summaries

4.1 Goal 1 Forensic Validation Findings
Law enforcement and other digital forensic investigators must be able to ensure
that they are using a clean Windows 7 environment upon each new investigation to
prevent cross-contamination between cases and preserve the probative value of the
evidence. Cross-contamination can include files/folders, malware, viruses,
applications, and case data left over from a previous case that was analyzed on a
specific forensic workstation.
The most common method of preventing cross-contamination is to perform each
investigation on a hard drive that had been wiped, re-formatted, and reconfigured for
forensic investigations [Forensics Investigations]. Forensics Steady State eliminates
the requirement to start a forensic workstation from scratch because all writes made to
the system are placed into a snapshot file that is easily discarded once rolled back,
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providing the user with a clean baseline Windows 7 image to perform more
investigations. While Forensics Steady State may be a fast and elegant solution for
law enforcement to use, proper forensic validation of the solution is necessary to prove
cross-contamination has not occurred.
4.1.1 File and Folder Write Test
The purpose of this test was to ensure that any files or folders created, used, or
accessed during a forensic investigation are removed upon rollback of the host.
Digital forensic investigations usually yield output files in the form of
recovered/exported evidence files, case files, reports, and temporary files. The
artifacts produced by an investigation must be completely removed to prevent crosscontamination between cases.
An MD5 hash value of the baseline image.vhd file was taken before the test to
later prove the rolled back solution accurately reflects a clean Windows 7 image. Test
Procedure 1, detailed in Section 3.3.1, was followed directly for this test. The test
specific functions included adding a text file and folder to the desktop. Notepad was
used to produce a plain text file “Test.txt” that was saved to the desktop. An empty
folder “Test Folder” with a copy of “Test.txt” in the directory was also added to the
desktop. Once both the text file and the folder containing a copy of the text file were
added, the test continued with Test Procedure 1, which included rolling back the
system and taking another MD5 hash of image.vhd.
As expected, once the solution was rolled back, both the text file and folder
containing a copy of the text file were deleted and solution was back to its baseline
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state. The MD5 hash of image.vhd remained the same retaining the forensic integrity
of Forensics Steady State.
Pre-test MD5 Hash
Post-test MD5 Hash

2aacf3dbe0501ad125290e24cf4c3c88
2aacf3dbe0501ad125290e24cf4c3c88

Table 4 - Matching Hash for image.vhd After Test 4.1.1

4.1.2 Application Write Test
The purpose of this test is to ensure any applications installed during an
investigation on a forensic workstation running Forensics Steady State will be
removed upon rollback of the solution.
An MD5 hash value of the baseline image.vhd file was taken before the test to
later prove the rolled back solution accurately reflects a clean Windows 7 image. Test
Procedure 1, detailed in Section 3.3.1, was followed directly for this test. The test
specific functions included installing an application and making sure any
remnants/artifacts of that application are completely removed upon rollback of the
solution. Apple’s iTunes was installed on Forensics Steady State, and once the install
completed, the test continued with Test Procedure 1, which included rolling back the
system and taking another MD5 hash of image.vhd.
As expected, no artifacts/remnants remained on the system after rollback and the
solution was back to its baseline state. The MD5 hash of image.vhd remained the
same retaining the forensic integrity of Forensics Steady State.
Pre-test MD5 Hash
Post-test MD5 Hash

2aacf3dbe0501ad125290e24cf4c3c88
2aacf3dbe0501ad125290e24cf4c3c88

Table 5 - Matching Hash for image.vhd After Test 4.1.2

4.1.3 Raw Hex Write Test – Volume Boot Record of Partition 2
The second partition of the hard disk containing the Forensics Steady State
solution houses both image.vhd and snapshot.vhd. The volume boot record for
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Partition 2 could be a target of malicious software, such as Cidox Trojan Horse
[Symantec], that may be the result of cross-contamination from suspect evidence. The
purpose of this test to determine if malicious software can make writes to the volume
boot record of the partition containing the vhd file that may not be reversed upon
rollback of the solution. In order to emulate writes to the boot sector, a hex editor, XWays’ WinHex, was used to make raw hexadecimal writes while the solution was
fully booted.
An MD5 hash value of the baseline image.vhd file was taken before the test to
later prove the rolled back solution accurately reflects a clean Windows 7 image. Test
Procedure 1, detailed in Section 3.3.1, was followed directly for this test. The test
specific functions included using WinHex to make raw hex writes to the VBR of
Partition 2. After the solution was fully booted, WinHex was opened. Using a
physical hexadecimal view of the hard disk, 4 bytes located at offset 0x130 within the
volume boot record of partition 2 were changed from “00 66” to “AA AA”. WinHex
immediately displayed a Windows error message explaining that the disk writes would
not be allowed:

Figure 4 - Windows Error Message Not Allowing Disk Writes

After the writes were made, the test continued with Test Procedure 1, which
included rolling back the system and taking another MD5 hash of image.vhd. The
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MD5 hash of image.vhd remained the same retaining the forensic integrity of the
baseline image.vhd image.
Pre-test MD5 Hash
Post-test MD5 Hash

2aacf3dbe0501ad125290e24cf4c3c88
2aacf3dbe0501ad125290e24cf4c3c88

Table 6 - Matching Hash for image.vhd After Test 4.1.3

However, after rollback, inspection of the bytes located at offset 0x130 within the
VBR of Partition 2 had retained the raw disk writes despite the Windows error
message. The installed anti-virus software, Microsoft Security Essentials, also did not
notice that the volume boot record had been altered. This unexpected result presents a
vulnerability of Forensics Steady State in that writes made directly to the disk outside
of image.vhd or snapshot.vhd may infect a forensic workstation, causing the need for a
clean Forensics Steady State environment to be created.
4.1.4 Raw Hex Write Test – Within Unpartitioned Space of the Disk
The hard disk containing Forensics Steady State was also examined outside of the
two main partitions present on the disk within unpartitioned space. The purpose of
this test is to examine if malicious software has the ability to write to unpartitioned
space on the hard disk. Once again, WinHex was used to emulate raw hexadecimal
writes to the unallocated space while the solution was fully booted.
An MD5 hash value of the baseline image.vhd file was taken before the test to
later prove the rolled back solution accurately reflects a clean Windows 7 image. Test
Procedure 1, detailed in Section 3.3.1, was followed directly for this test. The test
specific functions included using WinHex to make raw hex writes to the unpartitioned
space. After the solution was fully booted, WinHex was opened. Using a physical
hexadecimal view of the hard disk, 4 bytes located at offset 0xE8E0C00000 within the
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unallocated space of Partition 2 were changed from “00 00” to “AA AA”. Windows
unexpectedly allowed the writes, and after continuing with Testing Procedure 1 and
rolling back the solution, the writes were retained. This unexpected result presents a
vulnerability of Forensics Steady State in that writes made directly to the disk within
unpartitioned space may infect a forensic workstation, causing the need for a clean
Forensics Steady State environment to be created. The MD5 hash of image.vhd,
however, was verified to be unchanged:
Pre-test MD5 Hash
Post-test MD5 Hash

2aacf3dbe0501ad125290e24cf4c3c88
2aacf3dbe0501ad125290e24cf4c3c88

Table 7 - Matching Hash for image.vhd After Test 4.1.4

4.1.5 Raw Hex Write Test – Within image.vhd of Partition 2
With both the boot sector and unallocated space within Partition 2 of the hard disk
being tested, it is necessary to examine writes to image.vhd and snapshot.vhd. The
purpose of this test is to examine the behavior of making hexadecimal writes within
the image.vhd file while Forensics Steady State is fully booted.
An MD5 hash value of the baseline image.vhd file was taken before the test to
later prove the rolled back solution accurately reflects a clean Windows 7 image. Test
Procedure 1, detailed in Section 3.3.1, was followed directly for this test, with the test
specific functions of using WinHex to make raw hex writes within the image.vhd file
of Partition 2. After the solution was fully booted, WinHex was opened and using a
physical hexadecimal view of the hard disk, 4 bytes located at offset 0x74C6FC090
within image.vhd were changed from “00 00” to “AA AA”. As expected, Windows
would not allow the disk writes to be made.
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Testing Procedure 1 was then continued, which included rolling back the system
and computing another MD5 hash of image.vhd. After the test concluded, the solution
was booted once again and WinHex was used to verify the writes had not been made
despite the Windows error message.
Pre-test MD5 Hash
Post-test MD5 Hash

2aacf3dbe0501ad125290e24cf4c3c88
2aacf3dbe0501ad125290e24cf4c3c88

Table 8 - Matching Hash for image.vhd After Test 4.1.5

4.1.6 Raw Hex Write Test – Within snapshot.vhd of Partition 2
After making raw hex writes to the volume boot record, unallocated space, and
image.vhd files within Partition 2 of the hard disk, it was necessary to observe the
behavior of the solution when writes are made directly to the snapshot.vhd file.
An MD5 hash value of the baseline image.vhd file was taken before the test to
later prove the rolled back solution accurately reflects a clean Windows 7 image. Test
Procedure 1, detailed in Section 3.3.1, was followed directly for this test, with the test
specific functions of using WinHex to make raw hex writes within the snapshot.vhd
file of Partition 2. After the solution was fully booted, WinHex was opened and using
a physical hexadecimal view of the hard disk, 4 bytes located at offset 0x2D090 within
snapshot.vhd were changed from “00 00” to “AA AA”. As expected, Windows would
not allow the disk writes to be made. It is also important to note that any raw
hexadecimal writes made to any other files or the free space of this partition are also
protected by the Forensics SteadyState solution.
After finishing up with Testing Procedure 1, the test concluded with expected
results in that the disk writes were not allowed and never made. This was verified
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using a physical view of the hard disk within WinHex. The image.vhd file remained
unchanged:
Pre-test MD5 Hash
Post-test MD5 Hash

2aacf3dbe0501ad125290e24cf4c3c88
2aacf3dbe0501ad125290e24cf4c3c88

Table 9 - Matching Hash for image.vhd After Test 4.1.6

4.1.7 Raw Hex Write Test – Volume Boot Record of Partition 1
With the second partition testing being completed, the forensic integrity of
Partition 1 also needed to be verified. Partition 1 contains the WinPE environment
that Forensics Steady State uses to rollback and merge the solution. The volume boot
record of Partition 1 could be contaminated by remnants left over from a previous or
current investigation being performed on a forensic workstation. The purpose of this
test to determine if malicious software can make writes to the volume boot record of
the partition that may not be reversed upon rollback of the solution. Once again,
WinHex was used to make raw hexadecimal writes to the disk while booted into the
solution.
An MD5 hash value of the baseline image.vhd file was taken before the test to
later prove the rolled back solution accurately reflects a clean Windows 7 image. Test
Procedure 1 was followed directly for this test, with the test specific functions of using
WinHex to make raw hex writes within the volume boot record of Partition 1. After
the solution was fully booted, WinHex was opened and using a physical hexadecimal
view of the hard disk, 4 bytes located at offset 0x within the volume boot record were
changed from “00 00” to “AA AA”.
Windows unexpectedly allowed the writes, and after continuing with Testing
Procedure 1 and rolling back the solution, the writes were retained. The installed anti36

virus software, Microsoft Security Essentials, also did not notice that the volume boot
record had been altered. This unexpected result presents a vulnerability of Forensics
Steady State in that writes made directly to the disk within partition 1’s boot record
may infect a forensic workstation, causing the need for a clean Forensics Steady State
environment to be created. The MD5 hash of image.vhd, however, was verified to be
unchanged:
Pre-test MD5 Hash
Post-test MD5 Hash

2aacf3dbe0501ad125290e24cf4c3c88
2aacf3dbe0501ad125290e24cf4c3c88

Table 10 - Matching Hash for image.vhd After Test 4.1.7

4.1.8 Raw Hex Write Test – Outside Volume Boot Record of Partition 1
The first partition of the Forensics Steady State solution must also be examined
outside of the volume boot record. The rest of the partition contains the WinPE
operating system that is used to rollback and merge the solution when selected from
the pre-boot environment. The purpose of this test is to determine if any writes can be
made to the first partition of the hard disk when booted into solution. WinHex was
used to make the raw hex writes to the disk.
An MD5 hash value of the baseline image.vhd file was taken before the test to
later prove the rolled back solution accurately reflects a clean Windows 7 image. Test
Procedure 1 was followed directly for this test, with the test specific functions of using
WinHex to make raw hex writes outside of the volume boot record within Partition 1.
After the solution was fully booted, WinHex was opened and using a physical
hexadecimal view of the hard disk, 4 bytes located at offset 0x3D0 were changed from
“00 00” to “AA AA”.
The results of this test were unexpected, as seen similarly in Test 4.1.7, in that
Windows ultimately allowed the writes to be made without error. After continuing
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with Testing Procedure 1, the writes were retained after rollback. These writes could
be made to any file contained on partition 1. It is also important to note that any raw
writes made to the free space of this partition are also unprotected by the Forensics
Steady State solution. This result presents a vulnerability of Forensics Steady State in
that writes made directly to the disk outside of the boot record of Partition 1 may
infect a forensic workstation, possibly affecting the rollback and merge functionality
of the solution. This will cause the need for a clean Forensics Steady State
environment to be created. The MD5 hash of image.vhd, however, was verified to be
unchanged:
Pre-test MD5 Hash
Post-test MD5 Hash

2aacf3dbe0501ad125290e24cf4c3c88
2aacf3dbe0501ad125290e24cf4c3c88

Table 11 - Matching Hash for image.vhd After Test 4.1.8

4.1.9 Raw Hex Write to Virtualized C: Drive – Within Volume Boot Record
This test is designed to determine the behavior of Forensics Steady State when
raw hexadecimal writes are made to the volume boot record of the virtualized C drive
when the solution is fully booted.
An MD5 hash value of the baseline image.vhd file was taken before the test to
later prove the rolled back solution accurately reflects a clean Windows 7 image. Test
Procedure 1 was followed directly for this test, with the test specific functions of using
WinHex to make writes to the disk. After the solution was fully booted, WinHex was
opened and the virtual C drive was accessed with a logical view of disk. 4 bytes
located at offset 0x20 within the volume boot record were changed from “00 00” to
“AA AA”.
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Once the write was attempted, a Windows error was displayed: “Unable to lock
the drive, other programs may be using it. Access Denied”. Even though the error
message was present, the writes were made to the disk. The installed anti-virus
software, Microsoft Security Essentials, also did not notice that the volume boot
record had been altered. This is evident because after Testing Procedure 1 was
complete and the solution was rolled back, the solution was unable to boot. This result
presents a vulnerability of Forensics Steady State in that writes made directly to the
logical C drive outside of the boot record may infect a forensic workstation, possibly
affecting the rollback and merge functionality of the solution. This will cause the need
for a clean Forensics Steady State environment to be created. The image.vhd file
remained unchanged:
Pre-test MD5 Hash
Post-test MD5 Hash

2aacf3dbe0501ad125290e24cf4c3c88
2aacf3dbe0501ad125290e24cf4c3c88

Table 12 - Matching Hash for image.vhd After Test 4.1.9

4.1.10 Raw Hex Write to Virtualized C: Drive – Outside Volume Boot Record
This test is designed to determine the behavior of Forensics Steady State when
raw hexadecimal writes are made to the virtualized C drive outside of the volume boot
record within any file when the solution is fully booted.
An MD5 hash value of the baseline image.vhd file was taken before the test to
later prove the rolled back solution accurately reflects a clean Windows 7 image. Test
Procedure 1 was followed directly for this test, with the test specific functions of using
WinHex to make writes to the disk. After the solution was fully booted, WinHex was
opened and the virtual C drive was accessed with a logical view of disk. 4 bytes
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located at offset 0x1040 outside of the volume boot record were changed from “00 00”
to “AA AA”.
Once the write was attempted, the same Windows error from test 4.1.10 was
displayed explaining the write cannot be made. Even though the error message was
present, the writes appear to have been made to the disk and after Testing Procedure 1
was complete and the solution was rolled back, the writes were successfully removed.
It is important to note that the free space of the virtualized C drive is also protected by
the Forensics Steady State solution. The image.vhd file remained unchanged:
Pre-test MD5 Hash
Post-test MD5 Hash

2aacf3dbe0501ad125290e24cf4c3c88
2aacf3dbe0501ad125290e24cf4c3c88

Table 13 - Matching Hash for image.vhd After Test 4.1.10

4.1.11 System Update Test – Using snapshot.vhd without Sysprep
System updates are an important aspect of using forensic workstations within a
lab environment. As Windows or forensic tool updates release, it is important for
computer forensic investigators to make use of all current technology as well as
keeping their computers secure through Windows patches. Updating multiple
machines at once can be extremely time consuming, thus delaying future
investigations. Usually, when a master image is deployed onto multiple machines, the
System Preparation (Sysprep) tool is used. The sysprep tool prepares an image of
windows for duplication and removes any system specific data from that Windows
installation so that the image can be reused [TechNet].
This thesis project explores the idea of using the snapshot.vhd file located on one
machine to update another machine. Specifically, it explores the notion of updating
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one Forensics Steady State solution and using that machine’s exiting snapshot.vhd file
to update multiple machines by replacing the older snapshot.vhd file.
For this specific test, two Forensics Steady State solutions were deployed without
the use of sysprepping the original baseline image. Testing Procedure 4, detailed in
Section 3.3.4, was followed directly for this test. Once the first solution was rolled
back, a text file and a test folder were added to the desktop. The latest version of
Apple iTunes was also installed. With this solution being updated, it was shut down
and the snapshot.vhd file was copied to external media through the use of a BackTrack
Live boot disk. The hard drive belonging to the second Forensics Steady State
solution was then attached to the machine, and the snapshot.vhd file from the first
machine was copied to the hard disk of the second machine, overwriting the second
machine’s snapshot.vhd file.
The second machine’s hard disk contained an exact copy of the snapshot.vhd file
from the first machine. The second machine was then booted successfully. When the
Windows environment was fully loaded, all of the updates made to the first machine
were accurately reflected.
Although it is highly unlikely that a digital forensics laboratory would deploy
multiple machines without sysprepping, the possibility of using the snapshot.vhd file
to update another machine, validated by this project, may prove helpful.
4.1.12 System Update Test – Using snapshot.vhd with Sysprep
Test 4.1.14 attempted to update a Forensics Steady State machine by copying
over an updated snapshot.vhd file from another machine that was running Forensics
Steady State. Both machines were deployed from a baseline image that was not
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sysprepped. This test aimed to use the same procedure, but using two machines that
were deployed from a sysprepped image.
Additional test preparation was required for this test. The original source
machine was sysprepped and new baseline image was produced for deployment on
Machine 1 and Machine 2. The original Windows 7 image that was used to create
image.vhd was sysprepped using the files and instructions in the Steadier State
package. A new image.vhd was then created using the Steadier State boot media and
the image was deployed to both Machine 1 and Machine 2. Testing Procedure 4,
detailed in Section 3.3.4, was followed directly for this test. Once the first solution
was rolled back, a text file and a test folder were added to the desktop. The latest
version of Apple iTunes was also installed. With this solution being updated, it was
shut down and the snapshot.vhd file was copied to external media through the use of a
BackTrack Live boot disk. The hard drive belonging to Machine 2 was then attached
to the machine, and the snapshot.vhd file from Machine 1 was copied to the hard disk
of the Machine 2 overwriting the snapshot.vhd file.
The reboot process of the Machine 2, now containing the updated snapshot.vhd
file, failed and was unable to boot into the Windows 7 environment. This result
proves that a snapshot file cannot be shared between sysprepped machines and using
the snapshot file is not an option for updating multiple machines running Forensics
Steady State.
4.2 Goal 2 Forensic Validation Findings
Law enforcement investigators are typically trained to follow digital forensic
procedures in the acquisition, preservation, and analysis of digital evidence. This
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includes having a working knowledge of existing forensic software and hardware
tools. These investigators often do not possess the skills necessary to troubleshoot,
fix, or deploy forensic workstations. An important aspect of using a forensic
workstation during multiple on-going investigations is the system’s ease of use. For a
less technical savvy investigator, re-imaging a workstation after an investigation can
seem like a daunting task. The following tests focus on the ease of use of Forensics
Steady State as compared to other solutions such as Faronics’ Deep Freeze and
Horizon DataSys Inc’s Drive Vaccine.
4.2.1 Rollback Time Measurement
This first test investigates the process and time of rolling back a machine with
Forensics Steady State, Deep Freeze, or Drive Vaccine. Testing Procedure 2, detailed
in Section 3.3.2, was used to measure the rollback times of all three solutions. The
test specific functions included simply choosing the appropriate rollback option for
each individual solution. In order to rollback Forensics Steady State, the user simply
shuts down or reboots the computer leaving all default options selected. Likewise,
both Deep Freeze and Drive Vaccine roll back to their initial states with a simple
shutdown or reboot of the system.
Time was recorded with a stopwatch as soon as the machine was shutdown from
a running Windows environment and the rollback option was chosen. The time ceased
to be recorded once every solution’s Windows environment completed the booting
process. The test was performed five times for each solution due to varying boot
times and the results are presented in the figure below:
Forensics
Steady State

Deep Freeze
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Drive Vaccine

02:23.51
02:35.88
03:01.55
02:34.48
03:08.65

02:21.35
02:21.98
02:02.49
02:22.65
02:30.06

01:27.26
01:50:05
01:14.77
01:15.78
01:10.00

Table 14 - Rollback Time Comparisons

Average Rollback
Time

Forensics Steady
State

Deep Freeze

Drive Vaccine

02:44.80

02:19.70

01:23.60

Table 15 - Average Rollback Times

On average, Forensics Steady State has the slowest rollback time of the three
solutions, with Deep Freeze falling slightly behind and Drive Vaccine being the
fastest. In terms of ease of use, all three of the solutions have intuitive functionality.
4.2.2 Update Time Measurement
Being able to perform Windows updates and updates to forensic software is
imperative for law enforcement to keep their machines secure and guarantee they will
be using the latest cutting edge tools. The purpose of this test is to investigate both the
update time and ease of updating Forensics Steady State, Deep Freeze, and Drive
Vaccine.
In order to perform updates to Forensics Steady State the user must make all
desired updates and then place an empty text file named “noauto.txt” at the root of the
C drive while booted into the solution’s environment. Then, the user must reboot the
system and select the rollback option from the pre-boot environment. WinPE will
then start and instead of automating the process of deleting the snapshot.vhd file, it
will instead halt at the command prompt due to the text file at the root of the drive.
The user must then type “merge” and hit enter to update the baseline image.
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Deep Freeze is updated using a control console on a separate workstation. After
making all selected updates to the system, the user selects to “thaw” the solution from
the console application which will reboot the system without any write-protection to
any fixed hard disks. Once updates are performed, the user selects the “Reboot
Frozen” option from the console and system retains all changes when restarted.
Once desired updates are performed, Drive Vaccine’s baseline image is easily
updated by simply clicking on the Drive Vaccine application within the environment
and selecting the update option [Drive Vaccine User Manual]. No reboot process is
required.
For Forensics Steady State, the update time was measured from the point in
which the merge command was entered in the WinPE environment until the solution
was booted into Windows. The update time for Deep Freeze started when “Reboot
Frozen” was selected from the console and ended once the system was booted into
Windows. Drive Vaccine’s update time was not recorded because it happens
instantaneously and is negligible. The test was performed five times with a stopwatch
for each solution due to varying boot times and the results are presented in the figure
below:
Forensics Steady
State
01:34.78
01:33.56
01:20.84
01:31.51
01:47.33

Deep Freeze
01:33.93
01:31.72
01:13.92
01:23.80
00:56.35

Table 16 - Update Time Comparisons

Average Update Time

Forensics Steady State
01:33.60
Table 17 - Average Update Times

45

Deep Freeze
01:19.90

On average, updating Forensics Steady State takes approximately 14 seconds
longer than Deep Freeze and it does require minor technical ability.
4.2.3 Keeping Temporary Writes
Digital investigations performed by law enforcement may require an extensive
amount of time on a forensic workstation. These machines must be able to store case
files/folders, keep imaging programs open, or let any processes continue working
during non-work hours. Each of the three solutions examined in Section 4.2 have
methods of retaining temporary writes to the system without the worry of losing
current work or data.
Drive Vaccine allows users to keep changes temporarily by either leaving the
active solution booted into a Windows environment or updating the baseline image to
keep changes, which is not desired. Deep Freeze can retain temporary changes by
either keeping the solution in a “frozen” state or “thawed” state. Keeping the solution
in a write-protected mode will keep changes until the next reboot and all writes made
to the system in a thawed state will be retained permanently, which is not desired.
Potential problems could occur if power was cut to an active machine with Drive
Vaccine or Deep Freeze installed. For example, if a forensic workstation was taking
more than a few hours to image a drive, this process may be left in the laboratory to
complete overnight. If power is lost to the building or machine in some way, the
solution will rollback to its baseline image upon reboot, causing a possible loss of
data.
Forensics Steady State, however, operates much like a normal Windows 7
workstation. Any writes made to the disk will be kept temporarily until the rollback
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option is chosen from the pre-boot environment. The user also has the option to
shutdown or restart the system and continue working with the current state of the
solution. All changes are only discarded when the baseline image is restored. This
can provide law enforcement with a form of safety net for digital investigations
because the baseline image can only be restored if the option is chosen; losing power
or other unforeseen circumstances will not cause the loss of data in Forensics Steady
State.

4.3 Goal 3 Forensic Validation Findings
Performing a digital investigation in a timely manner is important for law
enforcement to be able to process and complete as many cases as possible. The
following tests will determine if Forensics Steady State does not substantially delay
investigations by comparing the solution to a normal machine running a Windows 7
Enterprise 64-bit operating system.
4.3.1 Reboot Time Comparison
Two machines were set up to measure the reboot time of Forensics Steady State
and Windows 7 Enterprise. Test Procedure 3, detailed in Section 3.3.3, was used to
measure the reboot time of each machine. Each machine was fully booted into their
operating system environments. After fully loaded, each machine was restarted and
duration of time it took each machine to fully restart into Windows was recorded. The
test was performed five times with a stopwatch for each solution due to varying boot
times and the results are presented in the figure below:
Forensic Steady State

Windows 7 Workstation
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01:00
01:03
01:02
01:04
01:03

01:10
01:15
01:18
01:28
01:27
Table 18 - Reboot Time Comparison

Average Re-boot Time

Forensic Steady State
01:02

Windows 7 Workstation
01:19

Table 19 - Average Reboot Times

On average, the re-boot time of Forensic Steady State was 17 seconds faster than
the machine running just Windows 7 Enterprise.
4.3.2 Forensic Steady State Rollback Comparison to Normal Windows Reboot
Two machines were set up to measure the rollback time of Forensics Steady State
and a simple reboot time of Windows 7 Enterprise. Test Procedure 3, detailed in
Section 3.3.3, was used to measure the appropriate times of each machine. Each
machine was fully booted into their operating system environments. After Forensics
Steady State was loaded, the time it took to restart and roll back to the baseline image
was recorded. The Windows 7 Enterprise machine was simply restarted and the
duration of time between reboot and being fully restarted was recorded. The test was
performed five times with a stopwatch for each solution due to varying boot times and
the results are presented in the figure below:
Forensics Steady State
(Rollback)
02:23.51
02:35.88
03:01.55
02:34.48
03:08.65

Windows 7 Workstation
(Reboot)
01:10
01:15
01:18
01:28
01:27

Table 20 - Rollback of Solution Compared to Normal Windows 7 Boot

Forensics Steady State
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Windows 7 Workstation

Average

(Rollback)
02:44.80

(Reboot)
01:19.00

Table 21 - Average Rollback Time (FSS) compared to Average Reboot Time (Win 7)

Simply re-booting a machine running Windows 7 Enterprise is significantly faster
than rolling back the Forensics Steady State solution by approximately 01:25. The
two machines are performing completely different functions but it proves that rolling
back to a pristine baseline image in Forensics Steady State merely takes 01:25 longer
than a simple reboot of a normal forensic workstation.
4.3.3 Merge Time for Forensic Steady State
The time it takes to update a baseline image of Forensics Steady State was
measured in test 4.2.2. Test Procedure 3, detailed in Section 3.3.3, was used to
measure the update time of the solution. The test specific functions included adding a
test file, “Test.txt” and test folder, “Test Folder”, to the desktop. The latest version of
Apple’s iTunes was also installed. The solution was then restarted, and the “merge”
command was run to update the baseline image. The update time was measured from
the point in which the merge command was entered in the WinPE environment and
was no longer recorded once the solution was booted into Windows. The test was
performed five times with a stopwatch and the results are presented in the figure
below:
Forensics Steady
State
01:34.78
01:33.56
01:20.84
01:31.51
01:47.33
Table 22 - Recorded Times to Update Baseline Image
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01:33.60

Average Update Time:

Table 23 - Average Baseline Image Update Time

On average, it took 01:33.60 for the baseline image to be completely updated in
the Forensics Steady State solution. This time is optimal and can allow for quick
updates to be made to the baseline image for further investigative use.
4.4 Goal 4 Forensic Validation Findings
Goal 4 of this thesis focuses on system stability and functionality with forensic
software to ensure the solution does not interfere with the forensic process. Tests
include observing how the system reacts to fixed disks being hot-swapped with the
machine, disk overflow behavior, and general functionality with software that is
consistent with tools used by the Rhode Island State Police.
4.4.1 Disk Overflow Test
The purpose of this test is to demonstrate what happens when the Forensics
Steady State solution runs out of hard disk capacity. Additional preparation for this
test was required in the form of adding a second storage device to the forensic
workstation. In this case, a 1 TB internal hard disk was added to the system.
Test Procedure 1 was followed directly for this test, with the test specific
functions including the use of FTK imager to image the newly inserted 1 TB hard
disk. Once the solution was fully booted, FTK imager was opened and used to create
an E01 image of the 1 TB drive. The virtualized C: drive of Forensics Steady State
was selected as the destination for the image file. FTK Imager started to image the
drive, segmenting it into parts until it required more space. The remaining image
segments were selected to be put on the D: drive until that too ran out of space. Once
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all storage locations were full, FTK Imager displayed a low disk space warning,
reporting that only 978 MB of free space remained on the hard disk:

Figure 5 - Disk Overflow Test Indicating Low Disk Space

Imager also asked to write the remaining image segments to a new location, but no
additional storage devices were added to finish the imaging.
After finishing Testing Procedure 1, the solution was properly rolled back erasing
all traces of the large E01 file and an MD5 hash of image.vhd was computed to verify
the baseline image remained unchanged.
4.4.2 Image File Write Test
The purpose of this test is to verify that the Forensics Steady State solution
functions appropriately when imaging external media.
Test Procedure 1 was followed directly for this test, with the test specific
functions including the use of FTK imager to image a 1 GB USB thumb drive. Once
the solution was fully booted, FTK imager was opened and used to create a raw dd
image of the thumb drive to the desktop. The image was created and saved
successfully and after finishing Testing Procedure 1, all remnants of the image file
were removed and a clean baseline image of the Forensics Steady State solution
remained.
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4.4.3 Forensic Tool Test
The purpose of this test is to verify that Forensics Steady State functions properly
with the use of a forensic tool and a software write-blocker. For the purposes of this
test, X-Ways’ Forensics was the selected forensic tool and ForensicSoft’s SAFE Block
was used as the software write-blocker. Both of these tools were included in the
baseline image of Forensics Steady State.
Test Procedure 1 was followed directly for this test. The first test-specific
function was to open X-Ways Forensics once the solution was booted. After ensuring
that SAFE Block was enabled, a 1 GB USB thumb drive was then inserted into the
machine and was successfully write-blocked. Using X-Ways Forensics, an E01 image
of the drive was made and saved to the internal hard disk. The image was then opened
in X-Ways and two deleted files were recovered and saved to the hard disk to simulate
case files that can/would be created from a digital investigation. A total of 359 MB of
case data, including the image, was created and saved to the machine. X-Ways was
then closed, and Testing Procedure 1 was finished.
Both the forensic tool and write-blocker behaved as expected and all created files
were deleted upon rollback of the solution.
4.4.4 Fixed Disk Test – Copying Files to a Write-protected Internal Hard Disk
Similar Steady State solutions, such as Deep Freeze, have caused problems for
law enforcement when trying to copy files from a forensic workstation’s local storage
to an additional fixed hard disk in the system. Internal hard drives are often attached
to forensic workstations via an eSata port or card for either imaging or exporting of
case files. It is imperative for law enforcement to be able to hot-swap hard drives
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during an investigation on a forensic workstation while using software write-blockers
and forensic tools simultaneously.
Testing Procedure 5, detailed in Section 3.3.5, was used for this test. After
booting into the Forensics Steady State environment, a 1 TB hard drive was connected
to the system via an internal eSata card during operation. SAFE Block was then
opened to ensure the drive was write-protected. To simulate writes to the newly
attached write-protected hard drive, a text file, “Test.txt”, and test folder, “Test
Folder”, were created and then copied over to the destination drive. Since the drive
was write-protected, a Windows error message was displayed indicating that writes
could not be made to the drive. The external drive was then disconnected from the
system to ensure no abnormal behavior occurred upon removing the disk.
The results of this test were as expected. The solution had no problems
recognizing the newly inserted fixed disk, write-protecting the drive, or detaching the
drive during the machines operation.
4.4.5 Fixed Disk Test – Copying Files to a Internal Hard Disk
This test follows directly from Test 4.4.4 with the only difference being that the
fixed disk added to the system will not be write-protected. Law enforcement needs the
ability to export case files and folders to external or internal media. Solutions such as
Deep Freeze write-protect all drive letters, unless this option is manually changed.
Copying files to external media connected to a machine running Deep Freeze can be
misleading in that the files may appear to be copied to their destination, but are not
actually written to the drive. Investigators may mistakenly think they are copying case
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files to another storage device, reboot their machine to a clean baseline image, and
realize the case files that appeared to be copied no longer exist.
Testing Procedure 5, detailed in Section 3.3.5, was used for this test. After
booting into the Forensics Steady State environment, a 1 TB hard drive was connected
to the system via an internal eSata card during operation. SAFE Block was then
opened and the newly attached drive was un-blocked allowing for the possibility of
writes to be made. To simulate writes to the newly attached hard drive, a text file,
“Test.txt”, and test folder, “Test Folder”, were created and then copied over to the
destination drive successfully. The additional storage device was then powered off
during the machines operation to ensure no abnormal behavior occurred. Once the
machine was shutdown, it was then booted into a Linux environment using a
BackTrack Live boot disk to make certain the test files were copied to the additional
hard disk.
Writing the test files to the additional storage device was successful. In
additional testing with Deep Freeze, the test files appear to be written to the storage
device successfully without error. After examining the storage device in BackTrack
Live, the files did not exist and were never written to the drive. Forensics Steady State
is more intuitive in that it acts exactly as the user would expect. Once attached storage
devices are un-blocked, writes are made to the drive, as expected.
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION

5.1 Discussion of Results
The results of all tests performed in Chapter 4 of this thesis helped meet all of the
goals of this project. This section will discuss all of the findings according to which
goal each test satisfied.
Goal 1 - To make a controlled environment solution that ensures that a sterile
digital forensics environment can be created each time a new case is started by law
enforcement investigators.
Goal 1 was met because of the results of the tests in Section 4.1. The logical
write Tests 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 both performed as expected. Once the solution was rolled
back, any files, folders, or applications added to the solution were deleted and the
solution was back to its baseline state.
Tests 4.1.3 through 4.1.10 tested Forensics Steady State’s ability to recognize raw
hexadecimal writes made to different areas of the hard disk, from both a physical and
logical view, and cache those writes within the snapshot VHD file. Tests 4.1.5, 4.1.6,
and 4.1.10 all performed as expected. Any raw hex writes made in Partition 2 within
unallocated space, within image.vhd, or within snapshot.vhd were all deleted upon
rollback of the solution, as expected. Any writes made to the virtual C drive outside
of the volume boot record were also eradicated upon rollback. Test 4.1.4, however,
failed in that it allowed raw writes to be made to the unpartitioned space of the disk
showing that unused area of the hard disk are not protected by Forensics Steady State.
Test 4.1.11 attempted to use the snapshot.vhd file located on one machine to
update another. Updating one Forensics Steady State solution and using that
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machine’s existing snapshot.vhd file to update multiple machines by replacing the
older snapshot.vhd file was successful for solutions that were not sysprepped. This
may not serve any practical purposes because the forensic workstations in a laboratory
are most likely sysprepped beforehand. Test 4.1.12 explored the idea of performing
the same test on two sysprepped machines, but failed proving multiple machines
cannot be updated by simply using a snapshot file from another machine. In this case,
either each machine would need to be updated separately or a new updated master
image could be used to re-image each individual machine in a laboratory setting.
Tests 4.1.3, 4.1.7, 4.1.8, 4.1.9, and 4.1.12 all had unexpected results and are
discussed later in Section 5.2.
Goal 2 - To make a controlled environment solution that is easy for forensic
practitioners to use.
Goal 2 was met because of the results of the tests in Section 4.2. Test 4.2.1
focused on the process of rolling back the solution and the roll back time measurement
of Forensics Steady State, Deep Freeze, and Drive Vaccine. In terms of ease of use,
the user simply needs to restart or shutdown any of the three solutions to roll back and
return to them to their initial state. Forensics Steady State has the slowest rollback
time of the three solutions, with Deep Freeze falling slightly behind, and Drive
Vaccine being the fastest. On average, Forensics Steady State took 02:44.80 to
rollback to its original state.
Test 4.2.2 focused on the process of updating each solution and measured the
update time of each of the three solutions previously discussed. In terms of ease of
use, the process for each solution is described in detail in section 4.2.2. Each solution
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has its own intricacies involved with updating the baseline image, and can be fully
understood with the provided literature for each. In this case, Drive Vaccine updated
the fastest. On average, Forensics Steady State took 01:33.60 to merge the
snapshot.vhd and image.vhd files and update the original baseline image.
Test 4.2.3 tested Forensics Steady State’s ability to keep writes temporarily. This
allows investigators the ability to shutdown a forensic workstation and continue
working with the current state of the solution at any time without losing any data until
the solution is rolled back. This can provide law enforcement with a form of safety
net for digital investigations because the baseline image can only be restored if the
option is chosen. Any unforeseen circumstances will not cause the loss of data.
Goal 3 - To make a controlled environment solution that does not substantially
delay investigations.
Goal 3 was met because of the results of the tests in Section 4.3. Test 4.3.1
measured and compared the re-boot time of Forensics Steady State and a normal
workstation with Windows 7 Enterprise installed. Unexpectedly, Forensics Steady
State rebooted with an average time 01:02. On average, the re-boot time of Forensics
Steady State was 17 seconds faster than the machine running Windows 7.
Test 4.3.2 compared the rollback time of Forensics Steady State to the re-boot
time of the same Windows 7 workstation in Test 4.3.1. As expected, the machine
running Windows 7 re-booted 01:25 faster than Forensics Steady State could rollback
to its baseline image. Although each machine was performing different functions, it
proves that rolling back to a pristine baseline image in Forensics Steady State merely
takes 01:25 longer than a simple re-boot of a normal forensic workstation.
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Test 4.3.3 measured the time needed for Forensics Steady State to merge its
snapshot.vhd and image.vhd files permanently changing the baseline image. On
average, it took 01:33.6 for the baseline image to be completely updated in the
solution. This time allows for quick updates to be made to the baseline image for
further investigative use.
Goal 4 - To have a solution that does not interfere with the forensic process.
Goal 4 was met because of the results of the tests in Section 4.4. Test 4.4.1
observed the behavior of Forensics Steady State when hard disk capacity was low or
about to overflow. As expected, the solution gave an error message stating that disk
space was low when an oversized image was being saved to the hard disk.
Tests 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 utilized functions of FTK Imager, X-Ways’ Forensics, and
SAFE Block to ensure proper functionality with Forensics Steady State. All tools
worked as expected, and any temporary files such as images, case files, and recovered
files were removed upon rollback of the solution.
Tests 4.4.4 and 4.4.5 tested the actions of attaching and write-protecting internal
hard disks while Forensics Steady State was operating. Specifically, Test 4.4.4
verified that inserting a fixed disk, write-protecting that disk, and attempting to copy
files to the disk all behaved as expected. Test 4.4.5 tested the same procedure, but
without write-protecting the fixed disk to make sure normal copying functions could
be performed. Previous tests with older versions of Deep Freeze caused system
crashes when internal disks were added to the system during operation. In additional
testing with newer versions of Deep Freeze, the test files appear to be written to the
storage device successfully without error, but after examining the storage device with
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BackTrack Live, the files did not exist and were never actually written to the drive.
This result would not be desired for investigators trying to export reports or temporary
case files to an external device, thus proving Forensics Steady State is a more viable
solution for digital forensic investigations.
Goal 5 - To document the controlled environment solution behaviors proving
forensic readiness.
Goal 5 was met through the production of this thesis. All of the tests developed
in the Forensics Steady State Test Plan provides a forensic validation of Forensics
Steady State. The tests were performed in a scientific manner and all results were
carefully documented. Each test was reproduced several times to prove that particular
behaviors of a specific test occurred each time the same test was performed.
Goal 6 – The reboot process of the solution should automate the roll back procedure
and boot directly into a Windows environment after completion, as required by the
Rhode Island State Police Computer Crimes Unit.
Goal 6 was met through the functionality that was added to the base
implementation of Steadier State to create Forensics Steady State. With the addition
of automating the rollback procedure, a user could essentially perform a simple
shutdown or restart of their Forensics Steady State solution and have a pristine
Windows 7 image restored without any future user interaction. Also, the additional
functionality that scans the physical drive for extraneous files gives investigators
notification that more files should be deleted manually before beginning a new case to
prevent cross-contamination.
5.2 Interesting Results
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Several tests run during the process of this thesis yielded interesting results. Tests
4.1.3, 4.1.7, and 4.1.9 all used Test Procedure 1 to make raw hex writes to the volume
boot records of specific locations on disk. Test 4.1.3 included making hex writes to
the volume boot record of Partition 2, the area of the disk storing image.vhd and
snapshot.vhd. Test 4.1.7 made hex writes to the volume boot record of Partition 1, the
area of the disk storing the WinPE operating system files. Finally, Test 4.1.9 made
hex writes within the volume boot record of the virtualized C drive that can be viewed
logically when booted into Forensics Steady State. Despite Windows error messages
and the fact that the anti-virus software Microsoft Security Essentials did not catch
that writes were made, all of the writes were allowed to be made to the boot sectors
and resulted in failure to boot the solution after restarting or shutting down the system.
These unexpected results present a vulnerability of Forensics Steady State in that
the boot sectors of any physical or logical partitions are not protected. This opens the
possibility of viruses/malware infecting the boot sectors of the logical or physical boot
sectors on the hard disk. Although it is highly unlikely that an infection would occur
in the boot sector of the WinPE partition, an investigator would still be able to
maintain the probative value of the evidence located in the second partition because
the virtual files are fully protected by Forensics Steady State. Any viruses/malware
that may affect the boot sector of the second partition would rely on another piece of
malicious code residing within the current state of the system, which can be rolled
back and eradicated making the infection harmless to the evidence. Finally, if the
solution no longer functioned as a result of an infection, an investigator would still be
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able to extract any current evidence from the solution because the virtual disks are
completely protected by Forensics Steady State.
5.3 Future Work
In order to ensure Forensics Steady State can be used for an extensive period of
time for forensic practitioners, some future work is required. Most importantly,
Forensics Steady State should be extended for use with Windows 8 and future
Microsoft Operating Systems to keep up to date with any forensic tools that require
newer operating systems. Other future work includes making changes to the existing
Forensics Steady State solution to make it more functional for law enforcement.
One such addition would be to prevent accidental rollback of the solution by
adding in a warning prompt whenever the option is chosen in the pre-boot
environment. Another recommended addition would be the provision of MD5 and
SHA-1 hashes of image.vhd in the pre-boot environment to verify that a sterile
environment has been achieved and the integrity of the baseline image is preserved.
This would include re-hashing image.vhd every time the system is rolled back.
Another functional addition to Forensics Steady State would be to add the ability
to scan new system for drivers to be included in WinPE while before solution is
deployed. This would eradicate any problems with the system’s communication to
hardware.
5.4 Conclusion
The results of this research show that Forensics Steady State is a viable solution
for law enforcement to use. Without having the capability of using current Windows
operating systems, law enforcement investigations have been delayed severely.
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Eliminating the need to wipe hard drives belonging to forensic workstations upon
completion of an investigation will facilitate the possibility of completing more case
investigations. Instead of spending part or all of a business day preparing a new
forensic workstation, investigators can simply use Forensics Steady State’s ability to
rollback to a forensically sound baseline image within just a few minutes. Updating
the solution is also an easy task and can keep the Windows 7 environment secure and
forensic tools up to date.
This research does suggest that Forensics Steady State is vulnerable to malware
or other infectious viruses that particularly affect the boot sectors of the solution. It is
important to note that the competitor products, Deep Freeze and Drive Vaccine, both
exhibit the same behavior when raw writes are made to the disk. Forensics Steady
State also lacks in speed when it comes to updating and rolling back the solution, but
the minimal extra time required is negligible and still saves law enforcement the
extensive process of starting from scratch after each investigation.
In conclusion, this thesis attempted to forensically validate and add features to the
Steadier State solution created by Mark Minasi for use at the Rhode Island State
Police Computer Crimes Unit. Forensics Steady State is an elegant, free Steady State
solution that is forensically sound for use in digital forensic investigations.
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APPENDIX 1: Forensics Steady State Creation Process

Download the necessary files:
Download WAIK from Microsoft: http://www.microsoft.com/enus/download/details.aspx?id=5753
Confirm it is the WAIK download from August 5, 2009
Burn this ISO file to a DVD or use an image mounter
Download the Steadier State files: http://www.steadierstate.com/
Create a folder C:\sdrstate and copy all of the files from the download to this
directory
Creating SS bootable USB or CD:
1. Open a command prompt with administrator privileges.
2. Navigate to C:\sdrstate and type the command: buildpe. Choose which type of
bootable media is desired:
a. Bootable USB Stick
b. ISO file that can be burned to DVD/CD

Creating the VHD from source PC:
1. Install all programs, change all settings, and fully prepare the PC you would like to
deploy as SS.
2. Sysprep source PC.
3. Power down the PC.
4. Connect the PC to either external storage or insert a second hard drive into the
computer.
5. Boot the computer into the SS bootable media created in previous section.
6. Run the following command to convert the PC to a VHD image file. (Note: The
external storage that will store the VHD file must be at least 2.5 times the maximum
VHD size)
cvtvhd %sourceDriveLetter% %desitnationDriveLetter%
%MaxVHDSize%
Example: cvtvhd c: d: 50
7. Shutdown the computer.

Deploy the image:
1. Remove any external storage.
2. Add a single wiped hard drive either internally or externally, ensuring it is the only
storage in the machine. This hard drive will become the target PC that Steadier State
is running from.
3. Boot back into the SS bootable media.
4. Run the command: prepnewpc
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5. Now, connect the hard drive containing the VHD file.
6. Use the following command to copy the image file over to the target hard drive.
robocopy %sourceDriveLetter% %desitnationDriveLetter%
image.vhd /mt:50
(Note: Make sure the size is the same used in previous section)
7. Upon completion, disconnect the external storage and shutdown.
8. Remove all drives from the PC ensuring that only the Target drive remains.
9. Boot into Steadier State.

64

BIBLIOGRAPHY

"About VHD." Windows MSDN. N.p., 26 Oct. 2010. Web.
"Boot Configuration Data Editor Frequently Asked Questions." Boot Configuration
Data Editor Frequently Asked Questions. TechNet, 25 Apr. 2007. Web.
Calvert, Charlie. "Charlie Calvert's Community Blog." Booting from a VHD. N.p., 2
Sept. 2009. Web.
"Computer Forensics, Malware Analysis & Digital Investigations: Forensic Analysis
of "Frozen" Hard Drive Using Deep Freeze." N.p., 3 Oct. 2010. Web. Jan.
2013.
"Deep Freeze Enterprise." Faronics. N.p., n.d. Web. Apr. 2013.
Drive Vaccine V10.3 User Manual. N.p.: Horizon Data Sys Inc., 12 Mar. 2014. PDF.
"Encase Image File Format." - ForensicsWiki. N.p., 15 July 2015. Web.
"Forensic Investigations." Forensic Investigations. XYZ Media, n.d. Web. 15 Apr.
2014.
Hoog, Andrew. "ViaForensics." ViaForensics MD5 Comments. N.p., 30 Nov. 2008.
Web.
Jain, Ranjana. "Simplifying Windows." Virtual Hard Disk (VHD) Architecture
Explained. Technet, 23 Mar. 2010. Web.
Macheras, Panos. "Infrastructure Architecture Blog by Panos
Macheras." Implementing a Windows 7 SteadyState by Utilizing Differencing
VHDs Files and the "Boot from VHD" Feature. N.p., 23 Jan. 2011. Web.
Macheras, Panos. "Windows 7 SteadyState™ Solution Simplified!" Technet.com.
N.p., 7 July 2011. Web.

65

<http://blogs.technet.com/b/panosm/archive/2011/07/07/windows-7steadystate-solution-simplified.aspx>.
Minasi, Mark. "Steadier State." Steadier State. N.p., 2012. Web.
<http://www.steadierstate.com/>.
"Tools." ForensicsWiki. N.p., 4 Nov. 2014. Web.
"Trojan.Cidox." Endpoint, Cloud, Mobile & Virtual Security Solutions. N.p., 7 July
2011. Web.
"What Is Sysprep?" What Is Sysprep? Microsoft TechNet, n.d. Web.
"Windows SteadyState™ Will Be Phased out." Microsoft Support. N.p., 17 Sept.
2010. Web. <http://support.microsoft.com/kb/2390706/en-us>.

66

